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tions. However, seen another way, the lack of interaction
across these fields is quite surprising, given the potentialIntroduction
This special issue of Neuron addresses two of the most costs in loss of shared knowledge and duplication of
effort—both in empirical research and theory building.basic and interesting questions about the neural bases
of human behavior: how reward is processed in the This is brought into striking relief in the articles in this
special issue, in which the authors address these topicsbrain, and how this influences our behavior. Indeed,
perhaps the most general observations that can be from a variety of perspectives. Two things stand out: (1)
there is a remarkably rich array of findings on thesemade about our behavior (or that of just about any organ-
ism) are that (1) its primary and ultimate goal is to seek topics and an equally diverse language for discussing
them, and (2) fundamental commonalities are beginningreward (and avoid punishment), and (2) we are not al-
ways so good at doing this. As elementary and self- to emerge, and efforts to bridge from one level of analy-
sis to another are starting to take hold. Indeed, oneevident as are these observations, a closer consider-
ation of each raises profound questions about the nature inspiration for this special issue was to explore just this
question: to what extent can our understanding of hu-of human behavior and how it is guided by reward. First,
how do we evaluate and compare the diverse forms of man behavior—focusing specifically on the mechanisms
underlying reward, reinforcement learning, and decisionreward—satisfying a biological need, pursuing a form
of leisure, living longer, or helping another—that are making—begin to bridge between neurobiological sub-
strates, behavior, and social consequences.available to us? From an evolutionary perspective, these
might all be viewed as mere stepping stones to the Needless to say, this topic could be the subject of an
encyclopedia, and so a limited treatment such as theultimate reward: ensuring the future of our genetic lin-
eage. However, from another perspective, that of the one offered here will provide only thin cuts through a
complex and multidimensional space. However, theseindividual going about her daily life, the more proximal
forms of reward are of paramount importance. They cuts offer a view of some of the most interesting and
challenging questions that confront efforts to bridgemust be assessed and compared to one another—in
implicit calculations if not within the full view of con- across levels and disciplines and a glimmer of some of
the exciting developments that are likely to occur as asciousness—so that she can decide, in a timely manner,
what to do next. How are these calculations carried out, result of these efforts. Arranging the order of these pa-
pers is something like arranging the seating at a weddingacross vastly different domains of information, in the
face of a staggering array of behavioral possibilities, so celebration: any order has its problems. We have opted
for simplicity, by presenting them in something like afrequently, and so quickly? The second observation is
equally perplexing. Why are we so often bad at doing bottom-up order.
this? Despite millions of years of evolution and its culmi-
nation in the truly glorious (though at times equally nefar- Down and Detailed: The Neural Underpinnings
ious) capabilities of the human brain, isn’t it remarkable of Homeostasis, Reward, and Addiction
that the behavior of even reasonably intelligent individu- The first article, by Saper and colleagues, reviews in
als can be as idiosyncratic, seemingly irrational, and detail the neural mechanisms that regulate one of our
sometimes patently counterproductive as it often ap- most basic needs: feeding. These can be viewed as
pears to be? One reason for this may be, as suggested distinct homeostatic and hedonic mechanisms, which
above, that the job is tough and our brains are just not interact. The homeostatic mechanisms include periph-
as good as we would like to think. The articles in this eral components—circulating hormones like leptin and
issue point to some alternative, more interesting, possi- ghrelin, produced in the stomach, gut, and adipose tis-
ble explanations. sue, and possibly acting on the hypothalamus and other
Questions about how biological organisms go about brain areas—that promote either feeding or satiety. They
maximizing their rewards, how decision-making pro- also include central homeostatic mechanisms, like mel-
cesses allow them to weigh the different sources of anocortin receptors in the hypothalamus that act to in-
reward and pursue some over others, how this serves hibit feeding, and orexin and melanin concentrating hor-
mone, produced in the lateral hypothalamus and acting
in areas that drive feeding. These homeostatic mecha-4 Correspondence: jdc@princeton.edu
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nisms may well go awry in feeding disorders such as bedevil humans suffering addiction, have been attacked
obesity, anorexia nervosa, and wasting (cachexia) asso- with other approaches. The article by Wise looks more
ciated with diseases like cancers and AIDS. Of course, broadly at how habits are transformed into compulsions.
feeding is a critical source of reward, and this can inter- Wise, who begins with an incisive review of reward anat-
act with the homeostatic mechanisms. When we are omy, examines two experimental approaches that by-
satiated, food we ordinarily like may be unpleasant; pass natural reinforcing stimuli: intravenous self-admin-
when we are hungry, food may taste better. But Saper istration of drugs and electrical self-stimulation of
and colleagues point out that the interactions are more specific reward regions of the brain. These stimuli pro-
extensive than this. For example, fasting increases her- duce unmistakably compulsive behavior, often with only
oin-seeking behavior, and leptin can decrease this ef- brief initial experience. The search for the neural mecha-
fect. Leptin even inhibits sweet-sensitive cells on the nisms underlying this rapid switch from habit to compul-
tongue. These findings suggest that specific homeo- sion has begun, and Wise has clearly laid out the ques-
static systems interact with central reward evaluation tions and hypotheses that will set the stage for future
mechanisms; the role of the central reward system is a experiments. Wise’s article also points out that efforts
critical point that is taken up in the articles by Caron to understand addiction have already led to important
and colleagues, Wise, and Montague and Berns. new insights into the basic mechanisms underlying re-
Caron and colleagues describe addiction as being ward and learning.
caused by dysfunctions of reward systems. Insights may
therefore not only be of therapeutic value, these patho- Dopamine: Does It Have the Goods or Just
logical perturbations may indicate how reward mecha- Promise Them?
nisms normally work. Crucially, the behaviors present The first unifying insight, touched on in all of the first
in addicted humans—sensitization, tolerance, depen- three reviews, is that virtually all of the substances of
dence, compulsive drug taking, and relapse—are readily abuse somehow engage the dopaminergic system.
produced and quantified in animals using a variety of However, perhaps more startling is what has been
approaches, including molecular genetics. Caron and learned about this system. Once thought to be the medi-
colleagues focus on reverse genetic approaches to de- ator of primary reward, it is now becoming evident that
termine the roles of receptors, transporters, and intracel- the dopamine (DA) system may be more concerned with
lular signaling molecules, and on forward genetic the prediction of reward and the use of this information
screens to find genes responsible for altered response to strengthen behaviors that will increase its future likeli-
to ethanol and cocaine. Several remarkable findings hood. Schultz reviews his pioneering findings that have
have begun to emerge from this work. For example, led to this view. He describes tonic effects of DA that
knocking out the dopamine transporter does not abolish enable various behaviors (as is apparent in the deficits
the addictive potential of cocaine, suggesting that other experienced by Parkinson’s patients) and, equally im-
neurotransmitter systems may also be important media- portantly, phasic effects, which are interpreted as re-
tors of its reinforcing effects. Receptor knockouts pro- flecting the unexpected presence or absence of reward.
vide a powerful new way of parsing the functions of
Schultz proceeds to review data indicating how post-
different receptor subtypes. Dopamine receptor D1
synaptic specificity can be achieved with a widely
knockouts, for instance, show reduced sensitivity to the
broadcast signal and how dopamine might differentially
locomotor but not the reinforcing effects of cocaine,
influence different parts of reward circuitry. While per-while D2 knockouts show little modification of normal
haps still controversial, the interpretation of DA sig-responses to cocaine but appear much less sensitive
nals as reflecting reward prediction (or, more precisely,to the reinforcing properties of other agents, such as
errors in prediction)—rather than simply reflecting re-opiates and alcohol. Metabotropic glutamate receptor
ward as such—has provided a link between the classical5 knockout mice are noteworthy as the only mouse mu-
conditioning literature and the computational literaturetants that do not self-administer cocaine; the reasons
on machine learning. The contributions by Montaguefor this remain to be discovered but are likely to shed
and Berns and by Dayan and Balleine both take up thislight on basic reward processes. Finally, using forward
approach.genetics in the fly and zebrafish as well as the mouse
Montague and Berns review neurobiological, neuro-to screen for mutants in an unbiased fashion seems to
imaging, and human behavioral evidence that supportsbe providing intriguing and potentially valuable payoffs.
the view that the DA system computes errors in rewardAs Caron and his coauthors note, the surprising discov-
prediction and then extend this view in two interestingery of a tight genetic link between the mechanisms in-
ways. One is to argue that the information carried by thevolved in circadian rhythm, tyrosine metabolism (the
dopamine system can be used to establish a commonroot of the monoamine production pathway), and co-
currency among the various systems seeking to meetcaine responsiveness are an excellent illustration of how
the organism’s different needs and therefore competingforward genetics can produce unanticipated new ideas
to control behavior. They argue that this is subservedabout addiction and reward. Indeed, the fact that models
by the orbitofrontal/striatal system, which may serve asof addiction can be found in such simple systems sug-
a sort of neural clearing house for comparing differentgests the possibility that there are fundamental, and
needs and setting priorities for action based upon these.perhaps highly general, principles of function to be dis-
Second, by combining the DA reward prediction signalcovered.
with assumptions about the uncertainty of the future,Most of the molecular work at this point has been
they show that the formal characterization of the DAfocused on sensitization and tolerance, while compul-
sive drug seeking and relapse, the behaviors that so system bears a striking resemblance to at least certain
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components of standard finance theory on predicting time for doing so. Gold and Shadlen note similarities
between Turing’s methods and the behavior of neuronsfuture market values. We will return to this connection
in monkey parietal cortex during a sensory discrimina-below.
tion task. Neurons tuned to competing interpretationsDayan and Balleine’s contribution is equally provoca-
of the stimulus gradually increase their firing rates, untiltive. As the Montague and Berns article nicely illustrates,
one crosses a specified threshold. The time to do soone of the most exciting extensions of the theory that
correlates closely with the animal’s response time in theDA signals errors in reward prediction is the idea that
task.this information can be used to select actions that lead
Both this behavior and Turing’s decision-making pro-to future reward and to train the system to do so more
cedure can be described formally as random walk, orconsistently in the future. This provides a theoretical
diffusion, processes in which the system “drifts” towardlink between the role of DA in reinforcement learning
one of two opposite boundaries (thresholds), under theand its role in executive functions. This link has been
influence of noise, and along a gradient that favors driftsuggested by psychopharmacological studies (e.g., Lu-
toward one boundary or the other. Interestingly, diffu-ciana et al., 1992; Sawaguchi and Goldman-Rakic,
sion models have also had significant success in ac-1991), has been shown to be computationally sound,
counting for a wide variety of data concerning humanand can also account for certain behavioral data (e.g.,
performance in simple decision tasks, including quanti-Braver and Cohen, 2000, 2001; Egelman et al., 1998).
tative accounts of reaction time distributions and accu-However, Dayan and Balleine point out crucial differ-
racy (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff et al., 1999). Recently, Usherences in both behavior and the neural substrates of
and McClelland (2001) have used neural network simula-classical (or Pavlovian) conditioning (where food, water,
tions to show that diffusion dynamics arise as a naturalor shock is delivered no matter what the animal does)
feature of systems in which units representing differentand instrumental (or operant) conditioning (where the
response alternatives accumulate activity from sensoryanimal is rewarded or punished for its actions). This
input units, compete with one another through mutualleads them to propose a more elaborate, though hope-
inhibition, and signal a response when they cross a fixedfully more accurate, model relating the use of errors in
threshold. Furthermore, in studies of monkeys per-reward prediction to the selection and learning of ac-
forming saccadic eye movement tasks, Schall and histions. Their modified model allows for different neural
colleagues have observed similar behavior for neuronsmechanisms underlying classical and instrumental con-
in the frontal eye fields. This impressive convergenceditioning and takes account of important factors not
of findings suggests that diffusion models may provide aaddressed by previous models, such as the homeostatic
useful theoretical framework for understanding decisionstate (and therefore motivational significance) specific
processes in the brain. The features of such systemsto individual reinforcers. Careful attention to the details
are well understood in physics and mathematics, sug-of the empirical literature, coupled with an effort to cap-
gesting that formalisms from these disciplines may beture these in a rigorously specified mathematical form,
useful in developing theory and guiding future empiricalset this effort as an example of the type of theory building
research.that is most likely to help advance the field.
Gold and Shadlen, in their article, make the further
suggestion that rate of reward may act to dynamically
Decision Making: Neural Drifters
modulate the thresholds used for decision making and
The first six contributions focus specifically on the neural that this could provide a mechanism for optimizing per-
substrates of reinforcement and its role in learning. All formance with respect to speed versus accuracy. They
of these articles presuppose mechanisms responsible observe that the relationship between threshold and rate
for processing stimuli and executing behaviors that may of reward is nonmonotonic. Lowering the threshold will
lead to reward. However, it seems equally important to favor speed and, therefore, more opportunities for re-
ask: how does the brain go about evaluating the evi- ward. However, if it is too low, errors due to noise will
dence and making a decision that (it is hoped) will lead dominate the process, and thus the rate of reward will
to reward? The articles by Gold and Shadlen and by diminish. Raising the threshold favors accuracy (by
Schall and colleagues address these decision mecha- allowing greater time to “average out” the noise in the
nisms directly and describe how evaluative processes diffusion process). However, at the extreme, it will take
may influence them. Gold and Shadlen begin with an excessively long to respond, thus again diminishing the
interesting and colorful premise: when the nervous sys- rate of reward. Gold and Shadlen suggest that the ner-
tem must make a decision between two alternatives (in vous system may adapt the threshold to achieve a bal-
their example, determining the direction of motion of a ance between speed and accuracy that optimizes the
stimulus), it faces a problem similar to the one faced by rate of reward. This is an intriguing suggestion, which
British cryptanalysts trying to break the German Navy’s parallels other proposals regarding the influence of per-
Enigma code used during the second World War. To formance monitoring on decision-making processes.
solve this problem, Alan Turing and his colleagues made The article by Schall and collaborators focuses specifi-
use of statistical techniques that amounted to sequen- cally on this issue and, in particular, on the detection of
tially accumulating evidence for each of two opposing failures in performance. Indeed, as most of the authors
hypotheses about features of the code. When one of in this issue note, evaluation of costs is as important as
the hypotheses accumulated an amount of evidence evaluation of rewards in decision making but has been
that surpassed a specified threshold, that hypothesis much less well studied. Schall and co-authors review
was accepted. This procedure established both a crite- recent work in which Schall and his colleagues have
identified neurons in areas of medial frontal cortex, in-rion for accepting a hypothesis and a constraint on the
Neuron
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cluding the supplementary eye fields (SEF) and anterior a few recent experiments where monkeys and humans
make decisions under variable conditions and whilecingulate cortex, that respond either to errors or re-
sponse conflict (signaling uncertainty)— that is, costs playing economic games. Evidence of rational and irra-
tional behavior has appeared, and an understandingin processing. Furthermore, they describe stimulation
studies of cells in SEF that appear to influence the of their neural correlates will likely follow. Others have
begun to take a similar approach, seeking to character-threshold for units in other areas responsible for re-
sponse execution (e.g., in frontal eye fields). ize optimal decision-making processes from relatively
simple systems (e.g., Bialek and his colleagues’ use ofThese findings closely parallel results from human
studies using fMRI and scalp electrical recordings that information theoretic approaches to characterize the
coding and computation of motion in the fly visual sys-have suggested a role for medial frontal areas in perfor-
mance monitoring (e.g., Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring tem; Brenner et al., 2000) to the highest levels of cogni-
tive function (e.g., Anderson’s use of rational analysiset al., 1993; MacDonald et al., 2000), and computational
modeling studies that illustrate how such signals can be to characterize human memory retrieval and decision-
making processes; Anderson, 1993).used to regulate performance, by adaptively adjusting
response thresholds (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Holroyd Discussions about “optimal behavior” and “rational
agents” of course lead us to the second and perhapsand Coles, 2002). Together, these findings begin to
sketch the outline of a neural architecture for the adap- more disquieting of the two observations about human
behavior with which we began: why does behavior ap-tive regulation of decision-making behavior. This frame-
work can support the formulation of clearly testable pear so often to be suboptimal? Herrnstein (1997) was
among the first to highlight this difference, contrastingpredictions regarding the influence of task variables,
such as the nature, timing, and frequency of feedback, his matching law for how animals choose between dif-
ferent sources of reward with predictions made byon neurobiologically measurable quantities, such as the
rate of rise of neuronal activity and response thresholds, standard economic models. More recently, behavioral
economists have occupied themselves productivelyand their correlation with overt behavior. Perhaps the
most exciting aspect of this area of work, however, is identifying a myriad of ways in which people systemati-
cally make bad economic choices. Alan Greenspan,that clear bridges are being made between animal neu-
rophysiology, human neuroimaging and behavior, and chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, was recently
quoted as saying, in reference to market events, thattheoretical models that provide a formal and quantitative
account of these phenomena. “Our economic models have never been particularly
successful in capturing a process driven in large part
by nonrational behavior.” For example, faced with a de-Being High Minded: Just How Good Are We?
cision between two equally valued objects, subjects willThe issue concludes with a fascinating piece by
often chose a different, lesser valued object to avoidGlimcher, which takes an evolutionary perspective. The
making a decision between the two more similar onespreceding articles focus on how the brain processes
(Tversky and Shafir, 1992). People generally overesti-rewards and how this influences learning. Glimcher re-
mate the enjoyment or suffering they will derive fromfers to these as the “proximal causes” of behavior. He
anticipated future events (Gilbert et al., 2002). For exam-notes, however, that the systems subserving these be-
ple, they misjudge the significance of states such ashaviors are the product of natural evolution, wherein the
being rich or paraplegic by their emotional reaction toprimary reward is genetic survival. Therefore, a com-
the idea of becoming rich or paraplegic (Kahneman,plete understanding of behavior requires an apprecia-
2000). People also steeply discount future rewards rela-tion of the evolutionary pressures that lead to its devel-
tive to immediate ones (possibly explaining why savingopment—what Glimcher refers to as the “ultimate
is so difficult) and are impulsive in their evaluation ofcauses” of behavior. Behavioral ecologists have sought
present rewards relative to future ones (as Popeye’sto specify the behaviors of individuals that optimize evo-
friend Wimpy said: I will gladly pay you Tuesday for alutionary success. Glimcher notes the close correspon-
hamburger today) (Laibson, 1997). And, under the influ-dence that this work has with formal economic theory,
ence of powerful emotions or drives, people often endin its effort to specify the decision-making processes
up doing the opposite of what they think is best forthat organisms use to optimize their fitness (evolutionary
themselves, even at the moment of acting (Loewenstein,utility). This effort hopes to define the optimal set of
1996). There are several possible reasons why people’sdecision-making processes, which are assumed to be
reward evaluation and decision-making behaviors arethe product of natural evolution. He then argues that, just
often suboptimal.as sensory physiologists have drawn upon information
One is that the job is tough and evolution is not perfect.theory to define the most efficient way to process sen-
As the articles in this issue make abundantly clear, evalu-sory information and then used this as a theoretical
ating the many different sources of reward available,framework for studying sensory mechanisms in the
weighing their relative values, and choosing those thatbrain, so neuroscientists should exploit the theoretical
are the most likely to succeed from a myriad of possibledevelopments in behavioral ecology and game theory,
behaviors is a daunting task. Evolution may simply notas a guide for studying decision-making processes in
have been up to the job of producing an optimal mecha-the brain. This is not as far fetched as it might seem to
nism. Of course, the thrust of the arguments above issome. As noted before, Montague and Berns point to a
that this is not an acceptable or at least not a particularlyremarkable similarity between their neural model of fu-
satisfying answer. Glimcher offers one alternative: be-ture reward evaluation and economic theories about the
prediction of future market values. Glimcher describes havior is stochastic at the individual level but optimal
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at the population level. He offers, as an example of this, Conclusions
Finally, it is worth noting two important developmentsHarper’s observations about a flock of ducks distribut-
ing themselves between two sources of food. Each indi- that are reflected in this issue. The first is the wide
range and depth of empirical data relevant to the brainvidual duck flits stochastically between the two sources
of food but with a probability that implements the opti- mechanisms underlying behavior that are becoming
available to neuroscientists. This is, in part, a productmal distribution of ducks across the two sources. This
may explain the variability in an individual’s behavior of the explosion in technical developments that now
allow us to manipulate genes, conduct simultaneouswhile preserving its overall optimality. However, this
does not explain systematic biases in people’s behavior multiunit recordings in awake behaving animals and, at
a larger scale, image patterns of activity in the humanthat are suboptimal, such as some of the ones described
above. brain as subjects perform complex cognitive tasks. It is
now reasonable to ask questions that, as recently as aMontague and Berns provide a sketch for another
kind of answer. In their analysis of reward prediction decade or so ago, it seemed impossible to answer. The
second crucial development is a renewal of an acquain-mechanisms, they note ways in which the algorithm
proposed to explain DA function deviates from opti- tance between empirical data and formal theory within
the behavioral sciences. Over the course of the lastmality in leading to the procurement of reward. Indeed,
the deviations predicted by the algorithm are seen in century, the empirical study of behavior has drifted afield
of formal theory. Psychology, and more recently neuro-human performance. Interestingly, the characteristics of
the algorithm that produces these deviations may reflect science, has exhibited a vast hunger for new empirical
phenomena, with a limited appetite for characterizingadaptations to particular features of the environment in
which we evolved. For example, the tendency to steeply them in rigorous or formally explicit ways. Over roughly
the same period, a different set of disciplines took updiscount future value may reflect a legitimate adaptation
to a rapidly changing environment in which goods can- the challenge of developing formal theories of behav-
ior—economics and evolutionary biology. However,not be saved. That is, mechanisms may have evolved
as optimal adaptations to ancestral circumstances that these have had either little opportunity to acquire rele-
vant data or scant interest in doing so. While justifica-are no longer suited to the circumstances of our modern
world. That is, they may have been circumstantially opti- tions can be offered for these disciplinary developments
(and there are of course exceptions to each), it is becom-mal, but are not universally optimal. It is possible to
point to many examples of where this may be true, ex- ing increasingly apparent that each discipline would be
well served by attending to the tactics of the other.tending from economic behavior to moral reasoning. For
example, the strong visceral response we have to the Within neuroscience, for example, we are awash with
data that in many cases lack a coherent theoretical un-prospect of beating someone to death with our bare
hands seems incommensurate with the reaction we derstanding (a quick trip to the poster floor of the Society
for Neurosciences meeting can be convincing on thishave to pushing a button that will detonate a nuclear
weapon and kill millions of people thousands of miles point). Conversely, in economics, it is has become abun-
dantly evident that the pristine assumptions of the “stan-away. Of course, the former is a scenario for which
evolution (whether biological or, in this case, perhaps dard economic model”—that individuals operate as op-
timal decision makers in maximizing utility—are in directcultural) has had the time to respond. Unfortunately, the
solution that emerged does not seem to extend to the violation of even the most basic facts about human
behavior (the ascendance of behavioral economics, asmore recent but more threatening circumstances posed
by the second scenario (Glover, 1999; Greene, 2002). In noted above, attests to this fact). The articles in this
issue exemplify an encouraging and important trend, inother words, evolution is both circumstantial and slow.
Of course, it is also possible that evolution did the which the formal tools of economics and evolutionary
biology and other relevant disciplines, such as physics,best with the cards it was dealt, but that the hand itself
was not perfect. Pre-existing constraints imposed by computer science, and engineering, are being brought
to bear on the wealth of data available from psychologyour sensory and motor systems, and/or our cognitive
architecture (such as limitations in the capacity of and neuroscience. While the particular theories that are
offered in these articles are early ones in the develop-working memory), may have posed boundary conditions
ment of our understanding of reward and decision mak-on the optimality that could be achieved in our decision-
ing and will no doubt evolve or be replaced as progressmaking behavior. A consideration of all of these pos-
continues, nevertheless they are noteworthy achieve-sibilities, and their formal characterization, stands to
ments that have a more general importance: by bringingcontribute significantly to our understanding of the
formally explicit theories to bear on detailed experimen-mechanisms that subserve reward processing and deci-
tal data, they set a high standard of practice that prom-sion making in the brain. This, in turn, promises to pro-
ises to bring a true science of behavior to the behavioralvide a more realistic kernel for theories regarding the
sciences.larger scale effects of interactions among individuals,
such as are sought in population biology and macro
Referenceseconomics—fields in which existing theories seem to
have reached limits in their explanatory power. The term
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